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The Fiscal Anatomy of a Regulatory Polity:  
Tax Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU 
ABSTRACT 
The paper analyzes the common assumption that the EU has little power over taxation. 
We find that the EU’s own taxing power is indeed narrowly circumscribed: its revenues 
have evolved from rather supranational beginnings in the 1950s towards an increasingly 
intergovernmental system. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and 
ECJ tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, we show that at the same time, the EU exerts 
considerable regulatory control over the member states’ taxing power and imposes tigh-
ter constraints on member state taxes than the US federal government imposes on state 
taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity 
which specializes in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves political issues to the 
member states: despite strong safeguards, the EU massively regulates the highly salient 
issue of member state taxation. 
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The Fiscal Anatomy of a Regulatory Polity:  
Tax Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU 
1. WHO TAXES? 
Who has taxing power in the EU? Practically all EU scholars give the same answer: 
only the member states! Taxes, according to Andrew Moravcsik, are largely excluded 
from the EU policy agenda.1 The Member States, notes Giandomenico Majone, show a 
“stubborn resistance to Community interventions in areas such as … taxation”.2 Alec 
Stone Sweet agrees that the “EU governs principally through making rules …; it has 
little capacity to govern through taxation …”.3 James Caporaso also finds it to be “weak 
in terms of the traditional tax and spend functions of government”.4 Joseph Weiler calls 
the EU’s budget “laughably small”.5 And in Tanja Börzel’s analysis of the historical 
evolution of EU competencies, the EU’s tax policy competencies receive constantly low 
scores.6 Loukas Tsoukalis argues that the EU has spent an “inordinate amount of time” 
on tax harmonization “with rather little to show for it.”7 Even if harmonization occurs, 
EU policy is said to play only a subordinate role.8 Two prominent comparativists con-
clude that “taxation is still firmly in the hands of national governments.”9 We call this 
conventional wisdom about the EU’s tax policy abstinence the “no taxation thesis”. It 
has become a folk theorem of EU studies which is often stated but hardly ever tested. 
The purpose of our paper is to finally put it to empirical scrutiny. 
The “no taxation thesis” rests on two distinct claims. First, that the EU lacks a genu-
ine European tax resource, which would enable it to govern through its own financial 
means independently of the member states. And second, that the EU has very little con-
trol over national taxation and that, consequently, the member states retain substantial 
tax autonomy. We present supporting evidence for the first claim, by showing that de-
spite constant calls for the introduction of an EU tax, the finances of the EU have be-
come ever more intergovernmental over time. From fairly supranational beginnings in 
                                                 
1  Moravcsik 2002, 607. 
2  Majone 1996a, 60. 
3  Stone Sweet 2004, 239. 
4  Caporaso, 1996, 39. 
5  Weiler 2000, 235. 
6  Börzel 2005, 223. 
7  Tsoukalis 2005, 127. 
8  Moravcsik 2005, 365.  
9  Newton and van Deth 2005, 332. 
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the 1950s, the EU drifted towards a system of finance which is largely based on national 
contributions, controlled by the member states, and thus not fundamentally different 
from that of other international organizations such as the UN. We argue that the persis-
tent failure to institute a genuine European tax resource is not just a transitional phe-
nomenon on the way towards a fiscally empowered EU, but a structural feature likely to 
last. European integration does not appear to be following the precedent of advanced 
federal states, which invariably evolved from weak federal taxing powers in the 19th 
century to strong federal taxing powers in the 20th century.10 
The second claim of the “no taxation thesis”, by contrast, is refuted by the evidence. 
Based on a comprehensive data set comprising all secondary tax legislation of the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers and the entire tax jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice from 1958 to 2007, we show that the tax policy choices of the 
Member States are increasingly embedded in and constrained by EU institutions. While 
it is still national governments which levy taxes, it is often the EU which determines the 
shape and, occasionally, even the level of taxation. This applies to all important taxes, 
not only indirect, but also direct taxes, albeit in different ways. The “no taxation thesis” 
thus misses a decisive feature of the EU tax regime: while the EU lacks taxing power in 
the conventional, fiscal sense, it exerts considerable regulatory power over taxation. 
Indeed, as a comparison will show, it subjects state taxation to stricter regulatory con-
trols than the federal government in the United States (US).  
The significance of this finding goes beyond the partial rebuttal of a widely held but 
rarely tested empirical assumption about the EU’s role in an obscure policy field mostly 
left to specialists.11 Taxation is one of the constitutive powers of the modern state, and 
in fact its “source of life”12. This is why Joseph Schumpeter considered public finance to 
be “one of the best starting points”13 for analyzing the logic and historical transforma-
tion of the state.  It is also why Giandomenico Majone has argued that the essential 
starting point for understanding the EU is to acknowledge its fundamental fiscal impo-
tence. Given the EU’s lack of an independent taxing power, Majone argues, it is con-
strained to govern by non-fiscal means, that is by rules and regulations. In contrast to its 
tax-heavy member states, it is a purely regulatory polity.14 The view of the EU gaining 
control of apolitical market regulation and the member states retaining control of politi-
                                                 
10  E.g., McKay 2001. 
11  Major exceptions are Puchala 1984 and Radaelli 1997. 
12  Karl Marx cited in Campbell 1993, 164. 
13  Schumpeter [1918] 1991, 101. Next to Schumpeter’s classic, major works in this tradition include Goldscheid 
1917; Mann 1934; O’Connor 1973; Levi 1988; and Steinmo 1993. 
14  Majone 1996a, 65-66. 
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cally salient issues of taxation, spending and other core state activities has become 
something like the standard model of the Euro-Polity.  
Our analysis of the “no taxation thesis” has important implications for this model. It 
confirms that the EU is, and is likely to remain, a “regulatory polity” with little fiscal 
discretion as the model suggests. It also shows, however, that the substantive scope of 
EU regulation is much broader than the model assumes. It concerns not only highly 
technical matters of market governance with negligible redistributive side-effects, but 
also constrains the member states’ power to tax, a highly political issue of redistributive 
and ideological conflict. In contrast to national regulators, the EU regulates not only 
markets and the conduct of private market actors, but also the politics and the conduct 
of governments. Paradoxically, it is the purported protections of national tax autonomy 
(the lack of a genuine EU tax, the restricted tax policy mandate of EU institutions, and 
the unanimity requirement in tax harmonization) that promote restrictive European tax 
regulation.  
In section two, we develop the standard view of the EU as a multilevel regulatory 
polity. Sections three and four provide empirical analyses of the two parts of the “no 
taxation thesis”. Section five summarizes the main findings and contrasts the tax orders 
of the EU and the US. Section six explores implications of our analysis for the standard 
regulatory polity model of the EU.  
2. THE STANDARD MODEL: A MULTILEVEL REGULATORY POLITY 
Since the 1990s, an increasing number of scholars have converged around the notion of 
the EU as a system of multilevel governance. The major advantage of this notion, and 
arguably one reason behind its success in EU studies, is to liberate the debate on the 
“nature of the beast”15 from the categorical distinctions between unconstrained national 
sovereignty and a European superstate, between pure intergovernmentalism and pure 
federalism, which had stifled it since the 1960s. Most analysts now agree that authority 
in the EU is neither completely monopolized by member state governments nor by EU 
institutions but is shared between them.16 Most authors also agree that this sharing of 
authority follows a specific pattern that differs markedly from the one found in Western 
states.  
                                                 
15  Risse-Kappen 1996. Major contributions to this debate include Beck and Grande 2007; Caporaso 1996; Haas 
1971; Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996; Majone 1994; Puchala 1972; Ruggie 1993; and Schmitter 1996. 
16  This includes authors as diverse as Moravcsik 2005, 364 fn. 69; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Jachtenfuchs, 2001; 
Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Scharpf 1999; Bache and Flinders 2004, and Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999. See Pol-
lack 2005, 379-87 for an overview. 
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The key feature of the Western state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of force.17 
Other features include state control of taxation, education, and large-scale redistribu-
tion.18 Systematic accounts of EU decision making powers invariably show low scores 
for these key policy areas:19 the EU has neither the legal mandate nor the political means 
for independent policy activities in defense, law and order policies, taxation, spending, 
or education. Decision-making in these areas is by intergovernmental agreement, tightly 
controlled by the member states and with little input from, and role for supranational 
institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, or the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. The EU scores high, by contrast, in policy fields related to market 
creation (e.g., removal of barriers to movement, or monetary integration) and market 
regulation (e.g., occupational health and safety policies, environmental and consumer 
protection, or anti-trust). In these rather technical areas of low political salience, EU 
institutions have a broad mandate for action. Decision-making is by qualified majority 
voting in the Council or delegated to independent supranational bodies such as the 
European Commission or the European Central Bank.  
These findings have congealed to what could be called the “standard model” of the 
Euro-Polity. The key feature of this model is a specific pattern of vertical power shar-
ing, which different scholars describe in remarkably similar terms. According to Simon 
Hix “The EU is a multilevel system of government, which allows European citizens to 
make decisions about regulation of the continent-wide market at the European level 
while maintaining power over taxation and spending at the national level”.20 Liesbet 
Hooghe and Gary Marks agree: “policies that redistribute income among individuals are 
handled almost exclusively within national states, whereas policies having to do with 
trade and market integration are handled almost exclusively at the European level.”21 So 
does Andrew Moravcsik: “The EU’s current activities are restricted by treaty and prac-
tice to a modest subset of the substantive activities pursued by the modern state. Its 
mandate focuses primarily on the regulation of policy externalities resulting from cross-
border economic activities. […] Absent concerns include taxation and the setting of 
fiscal priorities, social welfare provision, defense and police powers, education policy, 
cultural policy”22 and a host of other non-economic policy activities. In brief, the EU 
                                                 
17  Weber 1978 [1922], 54-56; Poggi 1990, 4-18. 
18  C.f. Zürn and Leibfried 2005; Offe 1998, 103. See also Tilly 1985 for a historical argument. 
19  The first systematic measure of decision-making authority in the EU was provided by Lindberg 1971, 69. Up-
dates and modifications have been provided by Schmitter 1996; Börzel 2005; and Hooghe und Marks 2008. 
20  Hix 2008, 11. 
21  Hooghe and Marks 2008, 115. 
22  Moravcsik 2002, 607.  
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regulates the market and the member states do all the rest including taxes.23 The EU is 
not a state, but a regulatory polity.24  
We do not claim that broad agreement on this standard model of vertical power shar-
ing in the EU puts all controversy among EU scholars to rest. An important disagree-
ment persists with respect to the relative autonomy of the different levels in the Euro-
Polity. While Andrew Moravcsik in particular has argued that the member states are 
still in control of the EU’s basic constitutional architecture,25 others, like Gary Marks 
and Liesbet Hooghe have strongly objected to this “state-centric” claim.26 We do claim, 
however, that there is little controversy about four major points:  
(1) Independent EU policy making is largely restricted to highly technical and po-
litically inconspicuous issues of market regulation.  
(2) The member states retain control of highly politicized non-regulatory func-
tions such as taxation, defense, large-scale redistribution or education.  
(3) This pattern of power sharing between the EU and the member states is nor-
matively attractive. As the EU is not a full-blown democracy, it is patently un-
fit to handle politically salient conflicts of distribution or ideology. Since non-
regulatory tax and spend policies are prone to such conflicts, they should be 
left to national governments. The EU is uniquely fit, by contrast, to handle 
Pareto-improving issues of market creation and regulation. These issues are 
largely immune to distributive conflict because they increase allocative effi-
ciency, decrease market failure, and thus potentially benefit everyone.27 Gen-
erally, voters pay little attention to them and, thus, the EU’s democratic deficit 
is not a disadvantage. In fact, it may be advantageous, because it insulates the 
EU from the party politics and special interest group pressures that allegedly 
often corrupt regulation in national democracies.  
(4) This normatively attractive pattern of vertical power sharing is reflected in, 
and sustained by, Treaty restrictions on the EU’s range of policy instruments 
(basically limited to rules and regulation), policy mandate (broad in regulation, 
                                                 
23  For substantially similar accounts also see Streeck 1995, 395; Börzel 2005, 224; Hooghe and Marks 2008, 115; 
Héritier 1999; Alesina and Spolaore 2003, 210-211, and Caporaso 1996, 39. 
24  C.f. Majone 1996a, 1996b and 2005. In his later work, Majone has dropped his initial reference to the EU as a 
regulatory state in favor of regulatory polity.  
25  Moravcsik 1998. C.f. Pollack 2007 and Schimmelfenning 2004 for summarizing discussions of this 
approach. 
26  See in particular Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996 and also Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2003 and 2008.  
27  This argument has been forcefully made by Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; and Scharpf 1999.  
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narrow in other fields) and decision making powers (high and supranational in 
regulation, low and intergovernmental in other fields). 
Our empirical test of the “no taxation thesis” has obvious implications for this standard 
account of EU multilevel governance. Should we find that either EU institutions have 
access to independent sources of revenue or that they interfere substantially with na-
tional tax policy choices, this account would seem to require modification and norma-
tive re-evaluation.  
3. NO EU TAXING POWER 
At first glance, there is substantial evidence for the “no taxation thesis”. Unlike its 
member states, the EU has neither the legal mandate nor the administrative means to 
impose compulsory payments on individuals or corporations: it has no taxing power. 
This is not for lack of trying. The introduction of a genuine EU tax is a perennial issue 
in European politics. The Commission, supported by various expert panels and pro-
European policy-makers, has fought for the ability to tax since the 1960s, claiming, in-
ter alia, that European taxes would improve market integration, facilitate the operation 
of the monetary union, and bring the EU closer to the citizen by establishing a direct 
fiscal link to them.28  
Despite these efforts, the EU is no closer to having a tax of its own today than the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was back in the 1950s. In fact, it is fur-
ther away. As we will show, the importance of tax-like supranational levies for funding 
the Community budget has decreased, and the importance of national contributions has 
increased over time. There is a pervasive trend towards intergovernmentalism in EU 
finance. The so-called ‘system of own resources’ gravitates towards a funding scheme 
quite similar to that of international institutions such as the UN.29 
The ECSC Treaty of 1951 contained the seeds of a genuine European power to tax.30 
It empowered the High Authority to impose supranational levies on the production of 
coal and steel, and gave it considerable discretion to autonomously set the rate and base 
of levy. The levies were collected directly by the ECSC from individual coal and steel 
companies without any administrative assistance from the member states and thus close-
ly resembled supranational taxes.31 
                                                 
28  See e.g. Neumark Report 1963, 151; MacDougall Report 1977; European Commission 1998, 13-14; European 
Commission 2004, 9-12. 
29  E.g., Heinemann, Mohl and Osterloh 2008. 
30  C.f. Articles 49 and 50 of the ECSC Treaty. 
31  Strasser 1992, 74. 
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The Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957 also provided for 
a supranational system of Community finance, the so-called system of “own Commu-
nity resources”.32 In 1970, the Council designated customs duties and agricultural levies 
as the Community’s first own resources. As in the case of the ECSC levies, the rate and 
the base of these “traditional own resources” are set by EU institutions (in the frame-
work of the common commercial policy and the common agricultural policy respec-
tively), and are charged directly to certain economic agents (importers and agricultural 
producers), thus creating a direct, tax-like fiscal link between the Community and indi-
vidual or corporate citizens. Unlike ECSC levies, the traditional own resources are col-
lected by national rather than European authorities and pass through national budgets 
rather than directly to the European budget.33 Since the agents paying customs duties or 
agricultural levies are mostly corporate actors, the traditional own resources failed to 
create the visible fiscal link between the European institutions and the European citizen-
ship at large which the Commission and other ardent supporters of a federal Europe had 
longed for. Also, they serve primarily non-fiscal objectives such as trade liberalization 
and the stabilization of agricultural prices. It was obvious from the beginning, therefore, 
that they could not match the rising revenue requirements of the Community. 
The Value Added Tax resource (VAT), introduced in 1979, was supposed to allevi-
ate both problems. Envisaged as a European deduction of up to 1 per cent from national 
VATs (so-called “base-on-base method” because it piggy-backed the base of the Euro-
pean VAT resource onto the national VAT base), it would have allowed the Community 
to tap into a buoyant source of revenue and at the same time would have increased the 
Community’s profile as a revenue raiser in its own right. However, the implementation 
of the base-on-base method required a complete harmonization of national VAT bases 
because otherwise member states could have reduced their contributions to the Euro-
pean budget simply by curtailing their national VAT bases. While the Council achieved 
a substantial approximation in 1977, a complete harmonization proved elusive. This 
made the base-on-base approach unfeasible and tipped the scales in favor of a purely 
statistical approach to collecting the VAT resource (so-called “revenue method”).34  
The revenue method was administratively convenient but fundamentally changed the 
character of the VAT resource from a direct European charge on final consumers to a 
national contribution of the member states. Despite its name, the VAT resource is not 
directly linked to the VAT payments of European consumers but represents a national 
                                                 
32  Art. 201 EC Treaty (now Art. 269). 
33  Strasser 1992, 88-90. 
34  Genschel 2002, 80-95. Denmark used the fiscal base-on-base method until 1982, Ireland until 1985. Afterwards, 
all member states applied the statistical revenue method c.f. Strasser 1992, 91. 
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payment obligation of the member states. In essence, it is a purely statistical construct, 
calculated from harmonized data on aggregate national consumption, paid out of general 
tax revenue, and transferred to the EU in monthly installments. Critical observers con-
sider it as “revenue dressed up as an own resource”35 but not as a genuine own resource.  
The introduction of the so-called Gross National Income (GNI)-resource36 in 1988 re-
inforced the drift from supranational levies to national contributions. In contrast to the 
VAT resource, which at least initially was intended to have certain tax-like features, the 
GNI resource was conceived right from the beginning as a transfer from national treas-
uries. It is calculated on the basis of harmonized data on the GNI of the member states 
without even nominal reference to microeconomic events or actors. The GNI resource 
has quickly turned into the keystone of the own resource system. In 2007, it accounted 
for roughly 70 per cent of all own resources. Current reform trends point towards a fur-
ther expansion of its role in EU finance.37  
Figure 1: EU Own Resources as a Percentage of Total EU Revenue, 1971-2007 
 
Source: European Commission 2004 and http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-en.htm (last accessed Sep 27, 
2009),  own calculations 
Figure 1 illustrates the pervasive trend in the EU’s own resources away from direct 
charges on individual or corporate citizens towards national contributions of the mem-
                                                 
35  Strasser 1992, 90; c.f. Laffan 1997, 41. 
36  Until 1995, this resource was calculated on the basis of the gross national product (GNP resource). Since then, it 
is calculated on the basis of the gross national income (GNI resource). 
37  E.g. Grybauskaité 2008. 
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ber states, i.e., away from a genuine supranational power to tax towards an intergov-
ernmental revenue system. In 2007, almost 85 percent of EU revenues derived from 
national contributions, that is, VAT and GNI resources. Only 15 percent came from tax-
like traditional own resources. While the High Authority of the ECSC enjoyed consid-
erable discretion to set and administer ECSC levies, the EU Commission can only pro-
pose rates and bases of EU own resources which then have to be adopted unanimously 
by the Council, ratified by the parliaments of the member states, and administered by 
national tax authorities.38  
The trend towards national contributions in EU finance is reflected in, and propelled 
by, concerns about inter-nation distributive justice. These concerns emerged after Brit-
ish entry in 1973, and almost paralyzed the EU after Margaret Thatcher demanded “our 
money back” in 1979.39 The budget rebate for the UK solved this particular problem in 
1984 but at the price of drawing other member states’ attention to their budgetary net-
positions.40 By increasing the number of net-contributors to the EU budget, consecutive 
rounds of enlargement further increased the salience of distributive conflicts among the 
member states. As a consequence, the main cleavage in European budgetary debates is 
not between social classes as within the member states but between states. The norma-
tive reference point is inter-nation equity and the principle of the national ability to pay 
as in other international institutions, not inter-person equity and the principle of the in-
dividual ability to pay as in domestic politics. This explains why there are member state 
specific contribution rates to the VAT resource. Next to the UK, special rates also apply 
to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and a base cap is granted to member 
states with large VAT bases.41 The increasing intergovernmentalism in the EU budget 
may also help to explain its relatively modest size. While in Western federal states, the 
huge task expansion of the federal government since the early 20th century was accom-
panied by a huge expansion of the federal budget,42 the EU’s task expansion since the 
early 1990s was accompanied by a stagnation of the budget.  
Many observers perceive the trend towards intergovernmental EU finance as patho-
logical. According to the Commission, it fosters “a narrow juste retour stance” 43 of the 
member states and deflects attention from the benefits of EU policies for Europe as a 
whole. A direct fiscal link between the European institutions and the citizen could help 
                                                 
38  See Pietras 2008, 16. 
39  See Laffan 1997, 52. 
40  See Laffan 1997, 54. 
41  See 2007/436/EC, Euratom, article 2. 
42  See Diaz-Cayeros 2004. 
43  European Commission 2004, technical annex p. 41 emphasis in original. 
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to reduce this bias and vindicate the EU as “a Union of Member states and citizens”.44 
The quest for a genuine European tax continues.45 However, its visionary appeal testifies 
to its lack of political plausibility. The creation of a genuine European taxing power is 
not on the agenda because it would bestow a degree of ‘stateness’ to the EU that seems 
less acceptable to governments and citizens with every round of enlargement.  
4. THE EU’S REGULATORY POWER OVER TAXATION 
While the EU has no taxes of its own, and is unlikely to get some any time soon, it has 
the power to regulate the taxes of the member states. As we will show, this power to 
regulate goes far beyond what is implied by the standard model of the EU as a regula-
tory polity.  
The EU’s regulatory power over taxation derives from its competence for the Single 
Market. The Single Market is defined as an “area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”46. To complete this 
market, the EU has to intervene in national policies creating such frontiers. Since goods, 
persons, services, and capital constitute the major tax bases of the member states (in fact 
there is hardly anything else to tax), this residual European power to regulate extends to 
all major taxes. As we will show, the EU institutions have used this power to slowly 
assert considerable control: the member states continue to levy taxes but EU institutions 
increasingly shape them. Two instruments are particularly important in this regard: the 
secondary tax legislation of the Commission and the Council (see section 4.1) and the 
case law of the European Court of Justice (see section 4.2).  
4.1. Secondary Tax Legislation 
The founding fathers of the EEC clearly understood that market integration requires tax 
policy coordination,47 but were concerned to keep the EU’s legislative authority limited 
in this area. The EC Treaty gives some law making powers to EU institutions but im-
poses strict functional and procedural constraints on them. Functionally, it premises EU 
tax legislation on the needs of market integration. It mandates the Council to harmonize 
national tax laws for one purpose only: to ensure the proper functioning of the Single 
Market.48 The  fiscal  and distributive  considerations  which animate  most domestic tax  
                                                 
44  European Commission 2004, 58, emphasis in original. 
45  See, e.g., Le Cacheux 2007, European Commission 2004; Cattoir 2004. 
46  Art. 14 TEC. 
47  Spaak Bericht 1956, 66-67. 
48  Art. 93 and 94 TEC. Art. 157 (3) TEC even explicitly prohibits the introduction of Community tax provisions for 
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Table 1: The secondary tax legislation1 of the EU, 1958-2007 
 1958-1967 1968-1977 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 
by tax area       
VAT 2 6.52 24 79 94.5 
Excise 0 7.5 15 30 65.5 
Corporate tax 0 0 0 2 3 
Personal Income tax 0 0 0 0 11 
Administrative Coop-
eration and miscella-
neous tax 0 6 2 9 25 
by legal instrument      
Regulations 0 0 0 8 13 
Directives 2 19 35 35 39 
Decisions 0 1 6 77 147 
by issuing institution      
Council 2 20 41 109 179 
Commission 0 0 0 11 20 
Total tax legislation  2 20 41 120 199 
Source: Eur-Lex, own calculations 
Notes: 1secondary tax legislation refers to binding legislative acts of the Council or the Commission concerning the 
national tax policy of the member states. Non-binding recommendations, opinions, etc. are not included. Also not 
included are binding acts concerning the customs code, state aid law or own resources. 2Some directives pertain to 
VAT and excises alike, for example directives on tax exemptions for individual travelers. They have been counted as 
0.5 against each of these taxes.  
policy debates are thus systematically excluded from the European tax policy agenda.49 
Procedurally, the Treaty subjects tax matters to unanimous decision-making. Each 
member state enjoys veto power over all acts of European tax legislation including 
those serving legitimate purposes of market integration.50 In contrast to many other pol-
icy fields, proposals to introduce qualified majority voting in taxation were invariably 
struck down by sovereignty-minded member states. Arguably, taxation is now the pol-
icy field with the highest degree of intergovernmentalism in decision-making, at least in 
the first pillar of the EU.51 Apparently, some governments have a strong desire to keep 
the EU’s influence over taxation weak. However, this has not prevented a strong growth 
                                                                                                                                               
the purpose of improving the competitiveness of European industry. 
49  Of course, once a market integration rationale has been established for tax harmonization, other policy considera-
tions also come into play (see e.g. European Commission 2001a). Importantly, however, they cannot formally 
justify tax harmonization. Note, however, that Art. 175 TEC empowers the Council to unanimously adopt “provi-
sions primarily of a fiscal nature” for purposes of environmental protection. 
50  Art. 93; 95 (1); and 190 (5) TEC. 
51  Börzel 2005, 222-23. 
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of secondary tax legislation. Table 1 gives an overview of all binding secondary tax acts 
ever issued by EU institutions. It highlights four trends. 
First, the production of secondary tax law has greatly increased. While the Commu-
nity of Six issued only two tax acts in its first decade, the EU of 15 and later of 25 mem-
ber states passed almost 200 tax acts between 1998 and 2007. Despite strict functional 
and procedural Treaty constraints, the adoption of secondary tax law is now a routine 
affair in EU politics. 
Second, the number of tax areas covered by secondary tax law has increased. In the 
1960s, the focus of EU tax legislation was exclusively on the introduction of a common 
VAT system.52 In the 1970s and 1980s, EU tax legislation extended to excises. The 
Council agreed on common rules for indirect tax exemptions for individual travelers,53 
and for tobacco taxation54, and also made its first cautious advance into regulating the 
administrative cooperation among national tax authorities.55 In the 1990s, it entered the 
corporate tax field by passing two directives on the taxation of multinational compa-
nies.56 In 2003, EU tax legislation extended into personal income tax with the so-called 
savings tax directive.57 As a result, the four major taxes (VAT, excises, personal income 
tax and corporate tax), which together account for roughly 85 per cent of EU-27 total 
tax revenue,58 are now covered by EU tax law. However, as Table 1 also shows, the 
coverage is very uneven. The vast majority of secondary EU tax law concerns indirect 
taxation (mostly VAT and excises) while the number of direct tax acts (corporate and 
personal income tax) is rather low. Closer inspection reveals that the systems, base defi-
nitions, rate structures and administrative procedures of VAT and excise taxes are regu-
lated comprehensively and in great detail while the harmonization of direct taxation 
remains rather sketchy.59 The difference in coverage and detail also shows in the differ-
ent length of harmonization directives. While the new VAT systems directive60 covers 
118 pages of the EU’s Official Journal, all corporate tax directives61 taken together cov-
er only sixteen pages. 
                                                 
52  See 67/2277EEC and 67/228/EEC. 
53  E.g. 69/169/EEC. 
54  72/464/EEC. 
55  77/799/EEC. 
56  90/434/EEC and 90/435/EEC. 
57  2003/48/EC. 
58  Own calculations based on Eurostat 2007. 
59  For a short summary of the state of play in EU tax harmonization see Uhl 2007. 
60  2006/112/EC. 
61  90/434/EEC; 90/435/EEC; and 2003/49/EC. 
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Third, the variety of legal instruments has grown. In the first thirty years of integra-
tion, the directive was virtually the only instrument of secondary tax legislation. As the 
directive is binding only with respect to the ends to be achieved but leaves some discre-
tion as to the means by which to achieve them, it was the instrument of choice for im-
posing unity on widely diverging national tax regimes. Indeed, it is still the preferred 
instrument for major acts of tax harmonization such as the horizontal excises directive 
of 1992,62 the savings directive of 2003, the introduction of the transitional system of 
VAT in 1991,63 or the new VAT system directive in 2006.64 However, since the late 
1980s the number of tax policy decisions has rapidly increased and has overtaken the 
number of directives in the 1990s. Decisions are mostly used to authorize specific dero-
gations from general harmonization directives for individual member states. Given that 
indirect taxes are much more thoroughly harmonized than direct taxes, most of these 
derogations concern VAT and the major excises. In a way, they provide a safety valve 
against an overly restrictive harmonization of these taxes. The accelerated growth of tax 
decisions thus provides prima facie evidence of the increasing restrictiveness of EU tax 
harmonization and testifies to the high level of European involvement in national tax 
policy making. Finally, regulations have also become somewhat more common since 
the 1980s even though their absolute number is still quite low. Since regulations are 
binding both with respect to the political ends to be achieved and the means by which to 
achieve them, and since they are directly applicable within the national legal orders of 
the member states, member state governments usually avoid them in sensitive areas. In 
the field of taxation, they are mostly used to lay down implementing provisions for oth-
er secondary tax law, especially harmonization directives65.  
Fourth, there is a mild trend towards delegated tax legislation. While in the early 
decades, all tax acts emanated from the Council of Ministers, more recently a small but 
increasing number of decisions and regulations have been issued by the Commission. 
The legal basis is provided by “parent” legislation of the Council which delegates law 
making powers for specific purposes to the Commission. The horizontal excise direc-
tive, for example, delegates authority over some administrative aspects of the common 
excise system.66 The new VAT system directive empowers the Commission to regulate 
                                                 
62  92/12/EEC. 
63  91/680/EEC. 
64  2006/112/EC. 
65  E.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 1777/2005 of 17 October 2005 or Commission Regulation (EC) No 2023/2005 
of 12 December 2005. 
66  92/12/EEC, Art. 24. 
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reduced tax rates for gas, electricity and district heating.67 While the substantive scope 
of delegation is limited, it is still remarkable that law-making powers are delegated at all 
given the member states’ strong insistence on retaining tax autonomy. 
In short, the evidence suggests that the frequency, coverage, and variety of tax legis-
lation have greatly increased. A growing number of issues concerning the rate, shape 
and administration of national taxes are now formally decided by the Commission and 
the Council. However, the evidence also shows that the scope of legislation varies 
greatly across taxes. Indirect taxes and especially VAT and the major excises are regu-
lated comprehensively by secondary law while direct taxation is hardly regulated at all. 
This does not mean, however, that direct taxation remains free of European constraints 
because since the mid-1980s, the ECJ has developed a large body of case law on the 
compatibility of direct tax rules with primary EU law. 
4.2. ECJ Tax Jurisprudence 
The legal order of the EU empowers the ECJ to review the consistency of national law, 
including tax law, with the acquis communautaire. Cases can be brought by other mem-
ber states, by the Commission or by private tax payers via the preliminary rulings pro-
cedure. Each tax case concerns a particular tax rule in a particular member state but the 
resulting case law has a harmonizing effect across taxes and member states because, by 
providing detailed reasons why the particular rule is (not) in line with EU law, it estab-
lishes general principles of acceptable tax policy for the EU as a whole.68 Table 2 pro-
vides a quantitative overview of the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ. It highlights four 
trends. 
First, the absolute number of tax cases has grown. While the ECJ handled only four 
tax cases between 1958 and 1967, it processed more than 400 such cases between 1998 
and 2007. 
Second, the number of tax areas covered has risen. For much of its history, the tax ju-
risprudence of the Court focused almost exclusively on indirect taxes (mostly VAT and 
excises). Since the 1990s, however, the number of direct tax cases (mostly concerning 
corporate and personal income taxes) has grown significantly. While the ECJ rendered 
only twenty judgments on direct taxation between 1988 and 1997, this number in-
creased to 101 between 1998 and 2007. The relative share of direct tax cases grew from 
less than 10 percent of all tax cases (1988-1997) to almost 25 per cent (1998-2007). All 
major taxes are now under constant judicial review by the ECJ. 
                                                 
67  2006/112/EC, Art. 102. 
68  For a general treatment of this issue, see Stone Sweet 2004, 30-35. 
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Third, the number of cases concerning the interpretation of secondary tax law has 
grown much faster than those concerning primary treaty law. More than 70 percent of 
the cases rendered between 1998 and 2007 dealt with secondary law (292.5 out of 417). 
Unsurprisingly, a closer inspection reveals that this share is much higher in indirect 
taxation: almost 98 percent of all VAT cases between 1998 and 2007 (203 out of 208) 
concerned secondary VAT law. The share is much lower in direct taxation, where little 
secondary law exists. Only about 20 percent of the corporate tax cases (10 out of 46.5) 
and no case concerning personal taxes related to secondary tax law.69  In other words, in 
indirect taxation the ECJ rules on the secondary legislation of the Council while in di-
rect taxation it mostly rules in lieu of Council legislation. In the former case, the juris-
prudence of the ECJ adds to the legal constraints of secondary tax legislation by clarify-
                                                 
69  The only exception is case C-87/99 (Zurstrassen) which amongst other issues dealt with the implications of the 
non-tax Council Regulation 1612/68/EEC for personal income taxation. 
Table 2: Tax jurisprudence1 of the ECJ, 1958-2007 
 1958-1967 1968-1977 1978-1987 1988-1997 1998-2007 
by tax area       
VAT 1 17 33.52 116 208 
Excise and other  
indirect tax 2 19 49.52 68 102 
Corporate tax 0 1 2 8 46.54 
Personal tax3 1 2 2 12 54,54 
Administrative  
Cooperation and  
miscellaneous tax 0 0 1 5 6 
by legal subject       
Primary law 4 29 56 68 124.55 
Secondary law 0 10 32 141 292.55 
by type of procedure      
Preliminary ruling 3 32 64 158 340 
Infringement (failure to fulfil 
obligation) 1 5 24 49 68 
Other 0 2 0 2 9 
Total tax jurisprudence  4 39 88 209 417 
Source: Eur-lex, own calculations 
Notes: 1tax jurisprudence refers to judgements of the ECJ on the compatibility of national tax law and European law. 
Orders as well as judgements on the EU’s own resources are not included. The categorization of cases as tax juris-
prudence does not follow the register of the ECJ because this register counts as tax cases only cases which have been 
decided on the basis of either primary tax law (the ‘tax chapter’ of the TEC) or secondary tax law. It thus misses 
many direct tax cases which have been decided on the basis of general treaty provisions on non-discrimination, the 
four freedoms or competition policy. 2Some judgements apply to VAT and excises. They are counted as 0,5 against 
each tax. 3Personal tax includes income, wealth, and inheritance taxes. 4Some judgements apply to corporate and 
personal taxes. They are counted as 0.5 against each tax. 5Some judgements refer to primary and secondary law. They 
are counted as 0.5 against each legal subject. 
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ing the meaning of this legislation and thus whittling away some of the formula com-
promises and ambiguities that originally secured unanimous agreement in the Council. 
In the latter case, it creates judge-made European tax law in a field in which the Council 
has traditionally refused to legislate because the member states could not or would not 
agree to European level rules. In other words: ”While European Union governments do 
their best to avoid harmonizing [direct] taxation, the EU’s court of justice is busy doing 
it for them.”70 
Most direct tax cases concern the compatibility of national tax provisions with the 
general non-discrimination and free movement guarantees of the EC Treaty.71 Direct tax 
regimes are liable to violate these guarantees, as historically they were designed to en-
sure efficiency and distributive fairness within national boundaries rather than non-
discrimination and unrestricted movement across them. Governments built up protective 
walls around national tax domains in order to prevent the mobile tax base from leaking 
out: tax advantages were limited to domestic situations, and extra tax or administrative 
requirements were imposed on international situations. The ECJ has taken a very critical 
view of these protective arrangements, and began shooting them down in the 1980s in 
the name of the market freedoms. An in-depth analysis of the corporate tax jurispru-
dence suggests that the member states lost almost three-quarters of all cases.72 This judi-
cial onslaught triggered a wave of national tax reforms. Governments in Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and elsewhere eliminated the once popular but inher-
ently discriminatory imputation system of corporate taxation. Also, domestic tax advan-
tages were extended to cross-border situations or eliminated altogether in order to pre-
empt anti-discrimination litigation. Indirectly, the ECJ’s tax jurisprudence also affected 
national tax rates because it fuelled corporate tax competition in the Single Market by 
eliminating tax barriers to cross-border transactions.73 The corporate tax jurisprudence 
also had important knock-on effects on personal taxation, for example in the treatment 
of individual wealth and capital income.74 Most tax lawyers agree that the ECJ “strongly 
influences almost all aspects of company tax law”75 and deeply affects the taxation of 
individual income and wealth.76  
                                                 
70  The Economist cited in Kaye 2007, 195. 
71  For more detail see Terra and Wattel 2005, 27-197; Aujean 2007; and van Thiel 2007. 
72  Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils forthcoming, table 2 
73  Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils, forthcoming. 
74  C.f. Terra and Wattel 2005, ch. 3. 
75  European Commission 2001b, 307. 
76  See e.g. Aujean 2007; van Thiel 2007; Terra and Wattel 2005, ch. 3. 
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Fourth, Table 2 shows that the tax jurisprudence of the ECJ is driven by two types of 
proceedings, references for preliminary rulings and infringement procedures. Prelimi-
nary rulings have always outnumbered infringement procedures by a significant margin. 
In recent years (1998-2007), the ratio has been five to one (340 to 68). The predomi-
nance of the preliminary rulings procedure gives the tax litigation before the ECJ a tax 
reduction bias because private tax payers will incur the costs of litigation only if they 
expect that a success will reduce their tax bill.77 To the extent that private litigants are 
successful in their actions, they lend encouragement to other potential litigants to follow 
their example. Thus, successful litigation begets more litigation and increases con-
straints on national tax autonomy. Infringement proceedings are almost invariably initi-
ated by the Commission. The Commission uses these proceedings primarily to ensure 
member state compliance with existing EU law, but also to create new law. By targeting 
tax obstacles which the member states refuse to remove by way of legislative harmoni-
zation, the Commission hopes to instigate case law which removes them by way of ju-
dicial harmonization.78 The accumulation of case law may then, in turn, facilitate con-
sensus building on legislative harmonization.79 
5. A COMPARISON OF EU AND US MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN 
TAXATION 
How does the “no taxation thesis” stand up to empirical scrutiny? The evidence pre-
sented in this paper supports the first part of the thesis: the EU does not have a source of 
income that even remotely resembles a tax. Despite half a century of trying, it has not 
managed to come closer to gaining the fiscal independence necessary to pursue large-
scale spending policies on par with central governments in national federations. If any-
thing, the EU’s fiscal independence has decreased. The system of ’own resources‘ has 
become more intergovernmental rather than less. While the economic case for a larger 
and more self-reliant EU budget is an old one, and has become stronger with the crea-
tion of Economic and Monetary Union,80 the political case has become weaker with 
each round of accessions. By increasing the heterogeneity of the member states and by 
raising uncertainty about future member states, enlargement has fundamentally under-
mined the willingness of national governments to consider more fiscal independence for 
EU institutions. The EU is thus likely to remain a fiscally weak entity for a long time to 
come.  
                                                 
77  Graetz and Warren 2007, 293. 
78  European Commission 2001a, 21. 
79  Aujean 2007, 329. 
80  MacDougall Report 1977. 
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At first glance, there is also support for the second part of the “no taxation thesis”. 
The EU’s regulatory authority is narrowly circumscribed in taxation. Functionally, the 
EC Treaty restricts its law making mandate to matters of market integration: the Council 
may harmonize national taxes only to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of 
the Single Market, but for no other purpose. Procedurally, it submits the tax legislation 
of the EU to the unanimity requirement.  
However, this is not the whole story. Tough Treaty restrictions notwithstanding, EU 
institutions have asserted considerable authority over national taxation: taxes remain 
national but are increasingly constrained by EU legislation and jurisprudence. To be 
sure, the constraining effect varies across taxes. Indirect taxes are more thoroughly 
regulated than direct taxes and corporate taxes more thoroughly than personal income 
taxes. It also varies across tax instruments. Tax systems and tax base definitions tend to 
be more narrowly circumscribed by European rules than tax rates. Most importantly, 
there are no binding European rules on maximum rates. The member states remain free 
to increase rates to raise more revenue even though their choice of rate structures and 
minimum rates is subject to legislative constraints in VAT, excises and savings taxation 
and competition constraints in corporate and (indirectly) personal income taxation.81 
Obviously, the EU has not totally taken over tax policy making, but is deeply involved 
in its regulation. The “no taxation thesis” completely misses this crucial point.  
To appreciate the distinctiveness of the EU’s fiscal architecture, we compared it to 
the US. We highlight three crucial differences. First, the US federal government has 
what EU institutions conspicuously lack: independent taxing power. Federal taxes ac-
counted for 56 percent of total US tax revenue (67 percent if social security contribu-
tions are included) in 2006,82 and the rate, shape and administration of these taxes is 
under the exclusive control of the US Congress. State governments have no vote in, let 
alone veto power over, federal taxation. The EU’s own resources by contrast, accounted 
for roughly 2 percent of total EU-27 tax revenue in 2007, they resemble national contri-
butions rather than taxes, and their rate, shape and administration is fully controlled by 
the member states.  
Second, US federal institutions have more formal authority to regulate state taxation 
than do EU institutions. The functional and procedural restrictions on US federal law-
making powers are softer. Functionally, the US Congress enjoys essentially unlimited 
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate state taxes affecting interstate com-
merce.83 This includes not only the power to constrain state taxation in the interest of 
                                                 
81  C.f. Ganghof and Genschel 2008. 
82  OECD 2009, Table E, own calculations. 
83  C.f. Hellerstein 2007, 69. 
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interstate commerce, but also the power to constrain interstate commerce in the interest 
of the tax autonomy of the states. By contrast, the EU Council of Ministers’ tax policy 
mandate is limited to market-enhancing legislation and does not include the protection 
of national tax autonomy. Procedurally, legislation in Congress is not subject to the 
unanimity requirement that governs the EU’s Council of Ministers’ tax decision mak-
ing. Also, state governments have no direct representation in Congress and, hence, can-
not interfere with, let alone block, federal legislation affecting their tax rates.84 Finally, 
the US Supreme Court has clear authority under the Supremacy Clause to strike down 
state laws that are incompatible with the Constitution, including tax laws, on a par with 
the ECJ’s competence to strike down national taxes.    
Third, US federal institutions have used their regulatory authority over state taxation 
much more sparingly than EU institutions. Congress has rarely exercised its Commerce 
Clause power to regulate state taxes.85 While it has recently legislated on issues such as 
state taxation of pension income or internet access,86 it has never engaged in the type of 
general tax harmonization that is the hallmark of EU tax policy. Also unlike the EU, it 
has not exclusively legislated in the interest of unrestricted interstate commerce, though 
occasionally to lift dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on state taxation. The Mobile 
Telecommunications Sourcing Act is a case in point. In essence, it authorizes states to 
tax mobile phone calls that might otherwise escape taxation as result of dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence.87 Similarly, the US Supreme Court has treated state taxes 
much more leniently under the US Constitution than the ECJ has treated national taxes 
under the EC Treaty. Oftentimes, it has simply refused to hear cases concerning state 
taxation – something the ECJ cannot do. At other times, it has exercised “an extra dose 
of judicial sympathy for state taxing power”88 – something the ECJ has typically been 
unwilling to do. While the ECJ has consistently refused to accept the revenue require-
ments of the member states as a valid justification for national tax provisions impinging 
upon the Single Market,89 the Supreme Court has paid considerable deference to the tax 
policy needs of state governments, and only struck down the most egregious cases of 
discriminatory state tax laws.90  
                                                 
84  C.f. McLure 2007, 139. 
85  C.f. McLure 2007, 134. 
86  C.f. Kaye 2007, 206-210. 
87  C.f. Fox and Swain 2007, 625. 
88  Laurence Tribe cited in Kaye 2007, 225. 
89  C.f. e.g. Terra and Wattel 2005, 81. 
90  C.f. Avi-Yonah 2007, 466. 
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Apparently, the “weak” institutions of the EU impose much stronger regulatory con-
straints on state taxation than the “strong” US federal government. Why? The reason for 
this puzzling result is that the very strength of the federal government obviates the need 
for strict constraints on state taxation while the weakness of EU institutions fosters it. 
The fiscal weight of US federal taxation reduces the importance of differences in state 
taxation for the functioning of the national market.91 In the EU, where all taxes are na-
tional, cross-national tax differences matter much more for market integration. At the 
same time, US federal taxation reduces the likelihood of differences in state taxation. 
The states derive roughly two-thirds of their tax revenues from tax bases “co-occupied” 
by federal taxes.92 Federal tax law therefore serves as a focal reference points for state 
tax legislation and provides for a considerable degree of tax homogeneity across states 
even in the absence of formal tax harmonization.93  
Finally, given the ample scope of federal authority neither Congress nor the Supreme 
Court is bound to approach state taxation from a narrow market integration perspective. 
Rather they can balance the federal interest in fiscally sovereign states against the fed-
eral interest in an integrated national market. This allows them to be lenient on eco-
nomically restrictive state taxation.94 The EU institutions, by contrast, cannot balance 
national tax autonomy against market integration because, as the EC Treaty makes 
clear, taxation is none of their business except where it affects market integration. The 
original idea behind this narrow policy mandate was, of course, to safeguard the mem-
ber states’ autonomy in taxation. The unintended effect has been to curtail their auton-
omy by delegitimizing revenue considerations in European tax policy discourse. Not 
only has the ECJ consistently refused to accept revenue requirements as a justification 
for restrictive national tax provisions,95 but national revenue interests are also usually 
discredited in Council negotiations as harmful ”national egoism” rather than as matters 
of common concern. To be sure, revenue considerations are ever present and inform 
national bargaining positions. However, they have to be draped in arguments about 
market integration in order to enter into official Council negotiations. This framing bi-
ases the secondary tax legislation of the Council towards market integration and against 
the protection of national tax autonomy, and helps to shield redistributive implications 
from public scrutiny.  
                                                 
91  C.f. Bird 1989, 149. 
92  C.f. Keen 1998, 460. 
93  E.g. Daly and Weiner 1993. 
94  C.f. e.g. Pelkmans 1988, 46. 
95  Terra and Wattel 2005, 81. 
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If the “height of success” in regulatory policy making is to render distributive conse-
quences invisible,96 then the EU’s regulatory tax policy has clearly reached the pinnacle. 
Its impact on national taxation is so invisible that it is regularly ignored and forgotten in 
domestic tax policy debate. It is thus quite common for national parties and politicians 
to campaign on tax policy proposals that conflict with EU law.97 Nicolas Sarkozy, for 
instance, pledged to reform the structure of French VAT rates in order to make the tax 
more equitable and efficient just to find out, after becoming president, that he needed 
the consent of the other 26 member states for that.98 A more recent example concerns 
the proposal of German Social Democrats in the federal election campaign of 2009 to 
introduce a new stock exchange turnover tax. Although the EU capital duty directive99 
prohibits such as tax, the German political debate proceeded largely as if a Social De-
mocratic government could have introduced it unilaterally.100 Even when the EU’s im-
pact on national taxation is reflected in domestic discourse, as it is most prominently in 
the case of corporate tax competition, the argument is usually not about the equity and 
legitimacy of this impact, but about the ways and means of national adjustment to it. 
Thus there have been numerous, and sometimes vigorous, political debates in the mem-
ber states about how much to cut national corporate tax rates to survive in (or profit 
from) European tax competition, but there has been hardly any debate about the desir-
ability of tax competition per se, simply because the level of competition is not a deci-
sion variable of national politics. Even the largest member states cannot determine it 
single-handedly.101 We conclude that the EU’s regulatory activities in taxation are of 
low political salience to European voters not because they are distributively neutral or 
ideologically innocent, but because they defy political contestation and, hence, voter 
attention.  
The comparison between the EU and the US highlights the essential features of the 
fiscal architecture of the EU: although it has no independent tax income like the US 
federal government, its influence on taxation is by no means as weak as the “no taxation 
thesis” suggests. Precisely because it lacks a tax of its own and must restrict its tax pol-
icy activity to what seems indispensable for the uncontested goal of market integration, 
the EU tightly constrains member state taxation. Its ‘horizontal’ regulation of member 
                                                 
96  Mabbett and Schelkle 2009, 700. 
97  Uhl 2008, 565. 
98  EurActiv 2008. 
99  See 2008/7/EC: article 5, para. 2 a. 
100  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 July 2009, 9. 
101  Ganghof and Genschel 2008. 
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state taxing powers compensates the lack of a ‘vertical’ delegation of taxing powers to 
EU institutions.  
6. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE REGULATORY POLITY MODEL? 
Our analysis of the “no taxation thesis” has important implications for the standard 
model of EU as a multilevel regulatory polity. This model assumes, first of all, that the 
EU is largely confined to regulatory means of policy-making. Our findings confirm that 
the EU focuses on regulation because it lacks autonomous taxing power. They also con-
firm that the focus on regulation is not a transient feature of the EU on its way towards 
eventual fiscal empowerment but one of its enduring attributes: there is no hint of the 
tax centralization that marked the historical development of advanced federal states for 
most of the 20th century. The EU is likely to remain a regulatory polity. 
Second, the standard model claims that EU regulation is largely restricted to techni-
cal matters of efficient market governance and leaves control of politically salient mat-
ters such as taxation to the member states. Our findings are contrary to this claim. The 
EU has developed a substantial body of tax legislation and jurisprudence that intrudes 
(counter-intuitively perhaps) deeply into the tax policy of its member states - much 
deeper, in fact, than the US federal government generally intrudes into the taxation of 
US states. We conclude that EU regulation has a much broader scope than is commonly 
understood. From creating and controlling the common European market, it branches 
out into controlling and constraining European governments. While the liberalization 
and management of cross-border economic activities may be its purported goal, the 
manifest effect is the shaping of domestic redistributive policy choices.   
Third, the standard model suggests that the pattern of power sharing in the EU is 
normatively attractive. Our findings provide reasons for doubt. They indicate that the 
regulatory activities of the EU are less distributively innocent than the standard model 
implies. They also intimate that the distributive implications of EU regulation system-
atically escape public scrutiny. In the tax case, at least, these implications are not politi-
cized at the EU level because the institutions involved – the Commission, the Court, and 
the Council – lack the means and the mandate to raise, represent and rule on conflicts of 
inter-personal distribution and equity (in contrast to issues of inter-state distribution and 
equity). The distributive implications of EU tax regulation also escape politicization at 
the national level either because they are simply overlooked until they actually become 
felt or because they enter the political discourse as external constraints to be accepted as 
matters of fact and not as decision variables open to contestation and political change. 
As Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix remind us, the salience of a policy issue is partly 
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endogenous to the political process.102 The tax regulation of the EU has low salience in 
the minds of European voters not because it does not affect them in important ways, but 
because it systematically escapes political debate and contestation.  
Finally, the standard model assumes that member state control of taxation and other 
politically salient policies is reflected in, and protected by, the EC Treaty. Again, our 
findings cast doubt on this assumption. To be sure, the Treaty severely constrains the 
EU’s policy powers in taxation, denying it access to a tax resource of its own, limiting 
its policy mandate to matters of market integration, and subjecting its decision-making 
to the unanimity rule. However, these constraints fail to protect national autonomy and, 
in fact, contribute to its erosion.  
To understand this counterintuitive result, first consider the lack of a genuine EU tax 
resource. Intended to deny the EU one of the most powerful instruments, and symbols, 
of national statehood, it unintentionally boosts the need for European tax harmonization 
and regulation. For, as long as taxation remains exclusively national, cross-national dif-
ferences in taxation have the largest possible potential to upset the Single Market. 
Hence, by keeping the EU fiscally weak, it increases the demand for strong EU regula-
tions. Next, turn to the restriction of the EU’s tax policy mandate to matters of market 
integration. This restriction was also meant to defend national tax autonomy by exclud-
ing the fiscal and distributive aspects of taxation from EU consideration. In effect, how-
ever, it biases EU tax legislation and jurisprudence towards ignoring these aspects. This 
is why the ECJ persistently refuses to consider the fiscal fall-out of its tax jurisprudence 
and why fiscal self-interest is often denounced as a national atavism in Council negotia-
tions. Thus the restriction of the EU’s policy mandate may inadvertently increase, rather 
than decrease, the risk of unwanted EU constraints on national tax autonomy.  
Finally, consider the unanimity rule. It is a common fallacy among policy makers 
and policy analysts to assume that unanimous decision making secures high policy 
autonomy for the member states.103 The underlying intuition seems compelling: as long 
as every single member state can strike down any new Commission proposal, the 
autonomy of each member state is safe from EU intrusion. However, this view over-
looks the constraining effect of accumulated old decisions. Legislation is indeed diffi-
cult to adopt under unanimity. But legislation once adopted is also difficult to amend, as 
any amendment requires repeat unanimity. Unanimous decision-making may, thus, lock 
the member states into a legal status quo that many, or even most, of them no longer 
like but cannot agree how to change. National tax autonomy is lost in the “joint decision 
                                                 
102  Føllesdal and Hix 2006, 546. 
103  See Ring 2008, 209-210 for instructive examples of this fallacy. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 114) 
- 24 - 
trap”.104 While the effect of the trap may be mitigated by selective derogations – as we 
have shown, a large share of secondary tax legislation authorizes derogations from 
European tax law to individual member states (see table 1) – the passage of these dero-
gations still requires a unanimous agreement of the Council, which may not always be 
forthcoming.  
When, for example, the German government asked for a derogation from European 
VAT law in 2007 in order to introduce a new, allegedly more fraud-proof, system of tax 
collection, it was turned down and forced to continue applying the old EU-mandated 
system.105 Note that the unanimity requirement also raises the barriers to overruling ju-
dicial decisions.106 This increases the discretion of the ECJ and puts the member states at 
risk of being locked into a judicial reading of the law that contradicts their original leg-
islative intent. As is well known, the barriers to a political correction of ECJ decisions 
are particularly high when the interpretation of Treaty provisions is concerned: Treaty 
amendments require unanimous intergovernmental agreement plus subsequent ratifica-
tion by national parliaments. Thus, ironically, the ECJ enjoys most discretion to impose 
judge-made rules in precisely those policy fields in which the member states are least 
able to agree on common legislative rules.107 The ECJ’s activities in the direct tax field 
provide a good example. Many tax lawyers argue that by poking holes into domestic 
corporate tax systems, the ECJ tries to nudge the Council into agreement on a harmo-
nized European system.108 The risk is of course, that the ECJ ends up destroying domes-
tic tax systems while the Council remains incapable of agreeing on common European 
solutions.109 The Council’s hesitance to embrace the Commission’s ideas for a common 
consolidated corporate tax base highlights this risk.110 Even if the Council adopted a 
common European system, it would do so in response to incentives set by the ECJ and 
not out of a genuine desire of its democratically elected members. 
In conclusion, our analysis of the fiscal architecture of the EU shows a constitutional 
reality which substantially differs from the standard model of the EU. While the EU has 
not been able to acquire any autonomous taxing power, it has imposed substantial regu-
latory constraints on the taxing power of the member states. This regulatory encroach-
ment took place despite the explicit desire of the member states to retain their tax 
                                                 
104  Scharpf 1988; Scharpf 2006. 
105  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 June 2007, 16; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 May 2008, 12. 
106  C.f. Pollack 2003, 169-175. 
107  This “dual character of supranationalism” has already been observed by Weiler 1982. 
108  C.f. e.g. Lang 2007, 12; Aujean 2007, 330. 
109  C.f. Avi-Yonah 2007, 468. 
110  European Commission 2001c, European Commission 2007 
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autonomy and despite the Treaty safeguards intended to protect it. In fact, these pur-
ported safeguards contributed to undermining autonomy.111 Our findings thus contradict 
a state-centric reading of Europe’s multilevel polity. They show that the member states 
have lost control, not only of policy processes, but also of constitutional developments 
in the EU. However, the regulatory framing of EU tax policy tends to conceal how 
deeply it affects national tax policy choices. The conventional wisdom according to 
which the EU is limited to politically inconspicuous market regulation and the member 
states control politically salient issues such as taxation seems in need of modification.  
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